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INTRODUCTION
Throughout Title VII’s history, Congress has amended and expanded Title
VII. Often, the Supreme Court has read such amendments and expansions
narrowly, even as it generally reads Title VII broadly or narrowly depending
on the case before it. The Court’s approach to Title VII expansions may merely
indicate that the Court believes that such statutory alterations should be read
only as broadly as necessary to effectuate their purposes. However, regardless
of why the Court has interpreted these expansions narrowly, that the Court has
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond. The author wishes to thank all who made
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 at 50: Past, Present & Future conference possible.
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done so suggests that Congress ought to consider carefully how it amends or
expands Title VII in the future.
This brief Essay examines how the Court has interpreted various
amendments and expansions of Title VII and suggests that Congress will need
to be very careful in how it expands Title VII to cover additional demographic
characteristics and protect employees against all instances of discrimination
Congress intends to ban. The Court’s interpretations may have implications for
the legislation like the proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act
(“ENDA”), which expands Title VII’s coverage to sexual orientation and
gender identity.1 Part I of this Essay discusses how the Court has interpreted
Title VII’s motivating factor test, which Congress installed as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 (“1991 Act”).2 Part II discusses how the Court has
interpreted Title VII’s disparate impact cause of action, also part of the 1991
Act. Part III discusses how the Court has addressed the reasonable
accommodation requirement in Title VII religion cases, which Congress
installed through its 1972 Amendments to Title VII. Part IV discusses how the
Court has interpreted pregnancy discrimination under the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978,3 which amended Title VII.
I.

MOTIVATING FACTOR: READING PROOF STRUCTURES NARROWLY

Title VII prohibits discrimination by an employer against an individual
“because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”4
However, when initially codified, Title VII did not specify how to prove that
an employer had discriminated against an employee because of that
employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Congress rectified that
by adding the motivating factor test to Title VII through the 1991 Act.5 That
test deems Title VII violated whenever an employer’s decision is motivated in
part by consideration of any factor deemed illegitimate under Title VII.6
1

See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. (2013) (adding
“an individual’s actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity” to the list of
characteristics on which an employer cannot discriminate). To be clear, the suggestion is not
that ENDA will or can pass. The point is that any bill that expands employment
discrimination coverage to sexual orientation, gender identity, and the like will have to
address interpretive issues.
2 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
3 Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k) (2000)).
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
5 For a longer discussion of the genesis of the motivating factor test, see Henry L.
Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII Disparate Treatment
Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 92-93 (2004) [hereinafter Chambers, The Effect of Eliminating
Distinctions] (“In the wake of Price Waterhouse, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
1991, which included changes to Title VII. The Act clarified the Price Waterhouse
plurality’s motivating factor test and made it a formal part of Title VII.”).
6 See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
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However, rather than treat the motivating factor test as the causation test for all
employment discrimination claims, the Supreme Court has treated the
motivating factor test as a secondary and inferior way to prove causation.7 In
the process, the Court has narrowed the effect of the motivating factor test and
rejected its expansion outside of a narrow portion of Title VII.8
A.

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins and the Motivating Factor Test

Congress installed the motivating factor test in response to the Supreme
Court’s fractured decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.9 In that case,
plaintiff Ann Hopkins was a senior manager who had been proposed for
partnership at Price Waterhouse.10 Rather than being granted or rejected,
Hopkins’s partnership bid was held for reconsideration.11 The partners cited
Hopkins’s interpersonal skills as reasons for the hold.12 The trial court deemed
those reasons legitimate and nondiscriminatory.13 However, other reasons also
triggered the hold. Those reasons appeared to be based on discriminatory sex
stereotyping.14 The Supreme Court had to determine how to analyze Title VII’s
causation clause when some motives for the employment action were
legitimate and others were illegitimate.
Price Waterhouse produced four opinions: a four-justice plurality, a
concurrence by Justice O’Connor, a concurrence by Justice White, and a threejustice dissent. The plurality opinion ruled that proof that a discriminatory
reason motivated the employment decision proved the elements of a Title VII
violation, subject to the employer’s affirmative defense that it would have
made the same decision had it not considered the discriminatory reason.15 The
plurality indicated that it was merely interpreting Title VII, rather than altering

7 See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2526 (2013) (calling the
motivating factor test a “lessened causation standard”).
8 See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 173 (2009) (refusing to expand
the motivating factor test to age discrimination claims).
9 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
10 Id. at 231 (plurality opinion).
11 Id.
12 See id. at 234-35 (stating that the trial court judge found that Hopkins’s supporters and
detractors “indicated that she was sometimes overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to
work with and impatient with staff”).
13 See id. at 236 (stating that the trial court judge “found that Price Waterhouse
legitimately emphasized interpersonal skills . . . [and] had not fabricated its complaints
about Hopkins’ interpersonal skills as a pretext for discrimination”).
14 See id. at 235 (citing partners’ remarks critiquing Hopkins as acting too masculine).
15 See id. at 244-45 (“We think these principles require that, once a plaintiff in a Title VII
case shows that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant
may avoid a finding of liability only by proving that it would have made the same decision
even if it had not allowed gender to play such a role.”).
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it.16 Justices O’Connor and White stated that proof that a discriminatory reason
was a substantial or significant factor in the decision shifted the burden of
persuasion on causation to the employer, leaving the employer to prove that it
would have made the same employment decision without using the
discriminatory reason.17 The dissent argued that the plaintiff ought to be
required to prove that the discriminatory reason was the but-for cause of the
adverse job action in order to recover.18
Congress installed the motivating factor test in the wake of Price
Waterhouse to clarify the mixed-motives causation issue.19 The motivating
factor test deems an unlawful employment practice to have occurred as soon as
an illegitimate factor motivates an employment decision, even if other factors
also motivated the decision.20 If the employer can prove that it would have
made the same decision regardless of the use of the illegitimate factor, it will
not be liable for substantive discrimination.21 However, the employer will still
be responsible for the employee’s attorney’s fees and costs.22 Though the
motivating factor test was passed in response to a mixed-motives case, its
language does not limit it to such cases.23 Consequently, the motivating factor
test arguably should apply to every substantive discrimination claim under
Title VII because it reflects how Congress defines “because of” in the context
of Title VII. The test reflects Congress’s view that discrimination occurs as
soon as an illegitimate factor motivates an employment decision, regardless of
whether the factor affected the outcome.
A broad reading of the motivating factor test suggests that it defines what
“because of” means not only in the context of Title VII, but also in the context
of other employment discrimination statutes.24 A narrow reading of the
motivating factor test suggests that the motivating factor test was installed in
Title VII solely to fix to the mixed-motives causation issue in Price
16

See id. at 248 (stating that its approach was consistent with prior Title VII cases).
See id. at 271, 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 259-260 (White, J., concurring).
18 See id. at 295 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The language of Title VII and our wellconsidered precedents require this plaintiff to establish that the decision to place her
candidacy on hold was made ‘because of’ sex.”).
19 See Chambers, The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions, supra note 5, at 92-93.
20 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter,
an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates
that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”).
21 See id.
22 See id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) (describing the scheme, which excludes recovery for
substantive harm, but allows recovery for “attorney’s fees and costs,” when the employer
proves it would have made the same decision had it not considered the illegitimate factors in
the decision-making process).
23 See id. §2000e-2(m).
24 See infra note 120 and accompanying text (describing what “because of” means in the
PDA).
17
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Waterhouse. Such a narrow reading might limit the test’s use to substantive
discrimination claims under Title VII.25 The Court has chosen the narrow
interpretation and has refused to extend the motivating factor test to
substantive discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”)26 or to Title VII retaliation cases.27
B.

Gross v. FBL Financial Services: Rejecting the Motivating Factor Test in
ADEA Cases

In Gross v. FBL Financial Services,28 the Supreme Court decided that the
motivating factor test does not extend to claims under ADEA, which bars
discrimination on the basis of an employee’s age.29 In that case, the employee
(Gross) sued, claiming that his reassignment was an age-related demotion in
favor of a younger colleague whom he had previously supervised.30 Gross
presented evidence that age was a factor in the reassignment; the employer
claimed the reassignment was based on corporate restructuring and that
Gross’s new position was better suited to his skills.31 The trial court gave a jury
instruction that reflected Title VII’s motivating factor test.32 The Supreme
Court found that providing the motivating factor instruction was improper and
that motivating factor claims are not cognizable under the ADEA.33 Noting
25 The Court has not limited the mixed-motives claim to situations that involve direct
evidence of illegitimate factors, as Justice O’Connor would have. See Price Waterhouse,
490 U.S. at 261, 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Rather, circumstantial proof of the use of
illegitimate factors in decision-making can trigger the motivating factor test. See Desert
Palace Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99-101 (2003) (holding that “a plaintiff need only present
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice’”). This makes the differences between a motivating factor case and a
pretext case slender. See Chambers, The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions, supra note 5, at
93-94 (“[S]ome Justices see virtually no difference between mixed-motives and non-mixedmotives cases . . . .”).
26 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202 (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-634).
27 See infra Part I.B.
28 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
29 Technically, the issue was “whether a plaintiff must present direct evidence of age
discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motives jury instruction” under ADEA. Id. at 16970. However, it morphed into the bigger question of whether the motivating factor test from
the 1991 Act should apply in ADEA cases.
30 See id. at 170 (discussing that Plaintiff considered the reassignment a demotion in part
because his employer reallocated some of his job responsibilities to his younger colleague).
31 See id. (“FBL defended its decision on the grounds that Gross’ reassignment was part
of a corporate restructuring and that Gross’ new position was better suited to his skills.”).
32 See id. at 170-71.
33 See id. at 169 (stating that a motivating factor jury instruction “is never proper in an
ADEA case”).
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that the ADEA and Title VII are different statutes and that the 1991 Act
codified the motivating factor test in Title VII and nowhere else, the Supreme
Court also held that mixed-motives causation—the precursor to the motivating
factor test—is not the correct causation standard under the ADEA.34
Consequently, the Court ruled that the proper standard under the ADEA is butfor causation.35
The Gross Court’s holding is not surprising if one believes that the
motivating factor test merely reflects Congress’s desire to clarify Price
Waterhouse. If Price Waterhouse merely interpreted Title VII, a clarification
of Price Waterhouse should arguably affect only Title VII. However, the
Court’s holding is surprising if one believes that the motivating factor test
reflects Congress’s definition of causation in the broader employment
discrimination context. If so, the expansion of the motivating factor test to the
ADEA would merely reflect the expansion of Congress’s definition of
causation to the ADEA, rather than the functional installation of new statutory
language—the motivating factor test—in the ADEA.
Ironically, the Gross Court rejected both Congress’s vision of causation—
the motivating factor test—and the vision of causation found in the plurality
decision and concurrences from Price Waterhouse.36 The Court’s refusal to
expand the motivating factor test to the ADEA may be justifiable. However,
after the Court rejected the installation of the motivating factor test, the more
sensible approach would have been to revert to Price Waterhouse’s definition
of causation in mixed-motives cases.37 The question at issue in Gross—
causation in a mixed-motives discrimination case—was the precise issue in
Price Waterhouse. Yet the Court ignored its Price Waterhouse decision and
chose but-for causation as the standard, even though that standard that had
garnered only three votes in a Price Waterhouse dissent.38 The Court took the

34 See id. at 180 (“We hold that a plaintiff bringing a disparate-treatment claim pursuant
to the ADEA must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the ‘but-for’
cause of the challenged adverse employment action.”). Justice Breyer dissented, suggesting
that the most an employee can be expected to prove is that a “forbidden motive” was used in
some way in the relevant decision. See id. at 191 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
35 See id. at 176 (“To establish a disparate-treatment claim under the plain language of
the ADEA, therefore, a plaintiff must prove that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the
employer’s adverse decision.”).
36 See id. at 182-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In Price Waterhouse, we concluded that
the words ‘“because of” such individual’s . . . sex . . . mean that gender must be irrelevant to
employment decisions.’ . . . Today, however, the Court interprets the words ‘because of’ in
the ADEA ‘as colloquial shorthand for “but-for” causation.’” (citations omitted)).
37 See id. at 185-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that Price Waterhouse is the
appropriate fallback position).
38 For a longer discussion of the implications of Gross, see Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The
Wild West of Supreme Court Employment Discrimination Jurisprudence, 61 S.C. L. REV.
577, 588-91 (2010).
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same approach in refusing to expand the Title VII motivating factor test’s
application to Title VII retaliation cases.
C.

University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar: Rejecting
the Motivating Factor Test in Title VII Retaliation Cases

In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,39 the
Supreme Court ruled that Title VII’s motivating factor test does not apply to
Title VII retaliation cases.40 In that case, the plaintiff brought a Title VII
substantive discrimination action against his employer, while also alleging that
the university retaliated against him for complaining about the alleged
harassment.41 Plaintiff was a staff physician at Parkland Memorial Hospital
and a professor at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center
(“UT”).42 He eventually resigned from his teaching position at UT after
exploring whether he could work solely as a physician at Parkland.43 That
arrangement would have violated the hospital’s agreement with the university
that required Parkland to offer vacant staff positions to UT medical
professors.44 Plaintiff claimed that an administrator at UT sabotaged his
agreement with Parkland, partly in retaliation for plaintiff’s complaint about
the alleged harassment.45 Consequently, the Court had to determine whether
the motivating factor test defined causation in a Title VII retaliation case.46 The
Court took a path similar to, but more troubling than, its path in Gross.
The Nassar Court began its causation analysis by suggesting that causation
links wrongful conduct to the right to compensation and noting that but-for
causation is normally required for recovery.47 It then noted that Congress’s
installation of the motivating factor test in Title VII triggered the possibility
that the motivating factor test could apply to Title VII retaliation claims.48
However, the Court determined that the motivating factor test could not be
applied to retaliation claims because the motivating factor test was embedded
in the Title VII section addressing substantive discrimination claims and not
retaliation claims.49 The Court also determined—as it did in Gross—that the
39

133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
See id. at 2534 (“The text, structure, and history of Title VII demonstrate that a
plaintiff making a retaliation claim under § 2000e–3(a) must establish that his or her
protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.”).
41 See id. at 2524.
42 Id. at 2523-24.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 See id. (“This case requires the Court to define the proper standard of causation for
Title VII retaliation claims.”).
47 See id. at 2524-25.
48 See id.
49 See id. at 2529 (“When Congress wrote the motivating-factor provision in 1991, it
40
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Price Waterhouse plurality did not provide the appropriate causation test
because the motivating factor test was meant to repudiate Price Waterhouse.50
Consequently, the Court held that the only appropriate causation standard for
Title VII retaliation claims is the but-for causation test that the Court used in
Gross.51
The Court has interpreted the scope of the motivating factor test narrowly.
Its hostility to the motivating factor test is clear. The Court has described the
test as a lesser form of causation and has treated it as a deviation from true
causation.52 Rather than consider the test a reflection of Congress’s substantive
view that discrimination exists whenever an illegitimate factor helps motivate
an employment decision, the Court has rejected the test as congressional
opinion regarding causation that need not extend past the context in which it
clearly must apply—Title VII substantive discrimination.53
In cases such as Nassar and Gross, the Court rejected expanding the
application of the motivating factor test in circumstances where the test could
sensibly have been used. The Court may not like the motivating factor test
because it was passed in the wake of the Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse.
However, given that the Court repudiated the Price Waterhouse plurality far
more directly in Nassar and Gross than Congress did—the motivating factor
test is closer to the mixed motives causation rule derived from the Price
Waterhouse plurality and concurrences than but-for causation is—it is more
likely that the Court substantively disagrees with the test. Regardless of
precisely why the Court has rejected the motivating factor test, the Court
appears determined to read the motivating factor test narrowly and stop its
expansion outside of the tight confines of Title VII’s disparate treatment cause
of action.
Part II considers how the Court addresses an entire cause of action it does
not appear to like.

chose to insert it as a subsection within § 2000e–2, which contains Title VII’s ban on statusbased discrimination, § 2000e–2(a) to (d), (l), and says nothing about retaliation.”).
50 See id. at 2534 (“Given the careful balance of lessened causation and reduced remedies
Congress struck in the 1991 Act, there is no reason to think that the different balance
articulated by Price Waterhouse somehow survived that legislation’s passage.”).
51
See id. at 2528 (“Given the lack of any meaningful textual difference between the
[retaliation clause] in this statute and the one in Gross, the proper conclusion here, as in
Gross, is that Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was the
but-for cause of the challenged employment action.”). However, the dissent noted that butfor causation is not a universal causation standard—even in normal tort areas, let alone
employment discrimination areas—and rejected “sole cause” as a part of original Title VII
jurisprudence. See id. at 2546 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he word ‘because’ does not
inevitably demand but-for causation to the exclusion of all other causation formulations.”).
52 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
53 For additional discussion of Nassar, see Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Supreme Court
Chipping Away at Title VII: Strengthening It or Killing It?, 74 LA. L. REV. 1161 (2014).
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DISPARATE IMPACT: READING CAUSES OF ACTION NARROWLY

The disparate impact (unintentional discrimination) cause of action has been
a part of Title VII since the Supreme Court’s 1971 decision in Griggs v. Duke
Power Company.54 The Griggs Court defined the disparate impact cause of
action when it held that an employer’s use of a facially nondiscriminatory rule
could be actionable if the rule both caused a disproportionate negative impact
on members of a group that shared a demographic relevant to Title VII, such as
sex or race, and could not be justified as necessary to the operation of the
employer’s business.55 However, the disparate impact claim was not codified
until Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in the wake of Wards Cove
Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio,56 in which the Court narrowed the disparate impact
claim.57 The disparate impact claim is an important part of Title VII.58
However, the Court has recently narrowed the claim’s effect and scope,
treating the claim as hostile to rather than complementary to Title VII’s
disparate treatment (intentional discrimination) claim and treating the disparate
impact claim as anything but an integral part of Title VII’s anti-discrimination
structure.
The 1991 Act clarified the content of the disparate impact claim.59 Pursuant
to the 1991 Act, a disparate impact claim can proceed in two ways. First, the
plaintiff proves that its employer’s employment practice has caused a disparate
impact.60 In response, the employer must prove that the employment practice is
“job related” and “consistent with business necessity.”61 If the employer does
so, it wins; if it fails to do so, it loses. Second, after the employee proves that
54

401 U.S. 424 (1971). Arguably, the Court merely recognized the cause of action. See
id. at 431 (“The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair
in form, but discriminatory in operation.”). However, the Court in Ricci v. DeStefano
suggested that Title VII as passed did not include a disparate impact cause of action. See
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. at 577 (“As enacted in 1964, Title VII’s principal
nondiscrimination provision held employers liable only for disparate treatment.”).
55 The disparate impact cause of action contrasts with the disparate treatment cause of
action, which requires intentional discrimination. Some have argued that disparate impact
could be considered an attempt to uncover latent intentional discrimination. See, e.g.,
George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of
Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1299 (1987) (“Because of the difficulty of proving the
defendant’s intent directly . . . the theory of disparate impact constitutes a justifiable
extension of the statute’s prohibitions against discrimination.” (footnote omitted)).
However, neither Supreme Court doctrine nor the 1991 Act has fully embraced that vision.
56 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
57 See id. at 656-57 (holding that a plaintiff’s showing of racial imbalance is not enough
to show disparate impact).
58 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012).
59 See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (clarifying the burden-shifting scheme in disparate impact
cases).
60 See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
61 See id.
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the employment practice has caused a disproportionate impact and the
employer proves that the practice was job-related and consistent with business
necessity, the employee can prove that the employer refused to use an
alternative employment practice that was just as effective as the employment
practice the employer used and would have had a less discriminatory effect
than the employment practice the employer used.62 In either circumstance,
proof of the disproportionate impact is proof of discrimination, and the
employer has the burden of proving that the employment practice is job-related
and consistent with business necessity with fairly strong evidence.63 The 1991
Act made clear that the disparate impact claim focuses on the employer’s use
of an unnecessary employment practice that effectively discriminates against a
group because of that group’s race, sex, or other characteristic noted in Title
VII.
Clarification of the disparate impact claim was necessary because the Wards
Cove Court misunderstood the nature of disparate impact discrimination. The
Court had treated proof of disparate impact as circumstantial evidence of
discrimination that could be rebutted with a mere assertion by the employer
that the employment practice at issue was supported by business necessity,
rather than as proof of discrimination that the employer had to affirmatively
justify.64 The Wards Cove Court required that the plaintiff disprove the
employer’s assertion that its employment practice was supported by “business
necessity” because the Court believed that proof of disproportionate impact
was not enough to prove that unlawful discrimination had occurred and
assumed that the burden of persuasion remained on the plaintiff to further
prove that discrimination had occurred. Congress clarified the nature of
disparate impact and the law regarding disparate impact through the 1991
Act.65
62

See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
The “business necessity” defense is like the bona fide occupational qualification
defense to proven intentional discrimination. See id. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (“[I]t shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the
basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise . . . .”).
64 The structure the Wards Cove Court provided for the disparate impact claim was
similar to the three-part test the Court created in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973), to address disparate treatment cases in which the plaintiff has no direct evidence of
intentional discrimination. For a full discussion of the McDonnell Douglas test, see Henry
L. Chambers, Jr., Getting It Right: Uncertainty and Error in the New Disparate Treatment
Paradigm, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1, 8-11 (1996).
65 For additional discussion of the relationship between Wards Cove and the 1991 Act,
see Melissa Hart, From Wards Cove to Ricci: Struggling Against the “Built-in Headwinds”
of a Skeptical Court, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261, 265-69 (2011) (“[T]he Court reversed
twenty years of disparate impact law and concluded that an employer seeking to explain
racial disparity with a ‘business necessity’ will not have to demonstrate that the practice in
63
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The disparate impact claim installed in the 1991 Act was structured in part
specifically to return the disparate impact cause of action to its pre-Wards
Cove form.66 One section of the Act noted that it was returning the law to its
content on the day before Wards Cove was decided.67 Another section of the
Act noted that the only document to be treated as legislative history applicable
to the Act was an interpretive memo noting that the law on several points
would return to the doctrine as it existed before Wards Cove.68 These
statements are about as specific as Congress could be in voicing its disapproval
of a particular Supreme Court decision and in attempting to eliminate any
effect that the decision could have in the future. However, Congress’s attempt
to repudiate the Wards Cove Court’s decision may ultimately fail. In the wake
of the 1991 Act, the Court has read the disparate impact claim relatively
narrowly.
The Court’s decision in Ricci v. DeStefano69 redefines and narrows the
disparate impact cause of action. At issue in Ricci was whether the City of
New Haven, Connecticut violated Title VII when it declined to certify and use
the results from tests that had been developed to determine which firefighters
would be eligible for promotion to lieutenant or captain in the city’s fire
department.70 When combined with New Haven’s other employment rules, the
use of the exam results guaranteed that very few minority firefighters would be
eligible for promotion.71 Though some minority firefighters had passed the
test, given where they were on the promotion list, their prospects for promotion

question is ‘essential’ or ‘indispensible.’”).
66 See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2; see also Michael J. Songer, Decline of Title VII Disparate
Impact: The Role of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and the Ideologies of Federal Judges, 11
MICH. J. RACE & L. 247, 253 (2005) (“In response to the Supreme Court’s restrictive
interpretation of disparate impact claims, Congress reversed parts of the Wards Cove
framework by passing the 1991 Civil Rights Act.”).
67 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C) (“The demonstration referred to by subparagraph
(A)(ii) shall be in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with respect to the
concept of ‘alternative employment practice.’”).
68 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, § 105(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991)
(“No statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at Vol. 137
Congressional Record S. 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall be considered legislative
history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative history in construing or applying, any
provision of this Act that relates to Wards Cove—Business necessity/cumulation/alternative
business practice.”).
69 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
70 See id. at 562-63 (“The suit alleges that, by discarding the test results, the City and the
named officials discriminated against the plaintiffs based on their race, in violation of both
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
71 See id. at 566 (describing that of the thirty-four candidates that passed, only six were
black and three Hispanic, and that the top ten candidates who were eligible, all of whom
were white, were selected).

792

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:781

were low.72 Simply, the tests had a disproportionate impact on the minority
firefighters.73 New Haven had to determine whether to certify the results.74
New Haven declined to certify the results based on its concern about the
potential for a disparate impact claim by the minority firefighters, its concern
for the racial makeup of its command officers, and its lack of confidence in the
test results.75 In response, the firefighters who would have been eligible for
promotion had the test results been used sued claiming disparate treatment
discrimination by New Haven.76
The Supreme Court analyzed the plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claim and
the putative disparate impact claim that would have been filed by minority
firefighters had New Haven certified the results.77 The Court determined that
the City had intentionally discriminated against the predominantly white
plaintiff firefighters on the basis of race.78 It found that New Haven’s refusal to
certify the test results because those who would lose would be predominantly
minority meant that New Haven’s refusal to certify the results occurred
because those who would win were predominantly white.79 The Court noted,
however, that the intentional discrimination could have been justified if the
City had faced a legitimate Title VII disparate impact claim from the minority
firefighters.80
The Court then considered whether New Haven would have violated the
disparate impact provisions of Title VII had it certified and used the test
results.81 Unfortunately, it improperly analyzed the minority firefighters’
putative disparate impact claim. Rather than consider whether New Haven had
sufficient evidence to support using test results that would have triggered a
disparate impact, the Court focused on how much evidence the minority
firefighters who would have brought suit would have had to challenge New
Haven’s use of the test results.82 The Court’s analysis was backward.
Discrimination would have been proven once the minority firefighters proved
that a disparate impact existed. The burden would then shift to New Haven to
prove that the employment practices at issue were required by business
necessity.83 New Haven would have needed evidence to prove that the tests
72

See id.
See id. at 567.
74
See id. at 567-74.
75 See id. at 562, 572, 574.
76 See id. at 562-63.
77 See id. at 578-88.
78 See id. at 592.
79 See id. at 579-84.
80 See id. at 563, 593.
81 See id. at 583-92.
82 See id.
83 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (stating respondent must then
“demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and
73
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were job-related. Nonetheless, rather than focus on the quality of the evidence
New Haven would or would not have had, the Ricci Court suggested that New
Haven lacked evidence that the tests were valid only because New Haven had
not sought to have the test results validated.84 Notwithstanding that New
Haven may not have had the evidence to prove that the tests could meet the
business necessity requirement, the Court implicitly found that use of the test
results was supported by business necessity and explicitly determined that the
minority firefighters’ putative disparate impact claim would have clearly lost.85
The Ricci Court essentially treated the putative disparate impact claim as if
it were to be analyzed under the Wards Cove disparate impact standard rather
than under the 1991 Act’s disparate impact standard. That approach narrows
the disparate impact cause of action and arguably destroys the effect of the
1991 Act. In addition to narrowing the disparate impact cause of action, the
Ricci Court’s analysis puts the cause of action at odds with Title VII’s
disparate treatment cause of action by suggesting that the awareness of race,
which occurs whenever an employer realizes that a disproportionate impact
exists, may trigger disparate treatment liability if the employer acts on the
knowledge of the disproportionate impact.86 That interpretation of disparate
impact is narrow and troubling and may be a prelude to further narrowing of
the disparate impact cause of action.
A broad reading of the disparate impact claim suggests that it has always
been a part of Title VII and works hand-in-glove with disparate treatment. A
narrow reading of disparate impact suggests that it has been added to Title VII
and is essentially at war with disparate treatment. The Court has begun to take
the latter path even though the former path better fits with the Court’s own
disparate impact jurisprudence. Part III considers the Court’s approach to Title
VII’s reasonable accommodation of religion requirement.
III. RELIGION: READING REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION NARROWLY
Title VII has barred religious discrimination in employment since its
inception.87 However, since 1972, Title VII has defined religious
discrimination to include an employer’s refusal to reasonably accommodate an
employee’s religion unless such accommodation is an “undue hardship on the
conduct of an employer’s business.”88 That reasonable accommodation
consistent with business necessity”).
84 See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 589.
85 See id. at 592.
86 Of course, disparate impact need not be read in this manner. See id. at 608-09
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that many reasons exist that would allow the City to
question the value of the merit assessment process without engaging in intentional
discrimination).
87 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
88 Id. § 2000e(j) (“The term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious observance and
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably
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provision was installed in Title VII to specify the employer’s duty under Title
VII.89 Soon after Title VII was enacted, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) interpreted Title VII to require that employers
reasonably accommodate employees’ religion.90 Congress codified the
EEOC’s interpretation in its 1972 amendments to Title VII, in the wake of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals.91 In Dewey, the
Supreme Court affirmed, without opinion, a Sixth Circuit case involving an
employee who refused to work on Sunday or find a replacement employee to
work in his stead as allowed by the employer.92 The Sixth Circuit had ruled
that firing the employee was not religious discrimination under Title VII
because the employer’s practice was a reasonable accommodation of the
employee’s religion.93 Partly in response to Dewey, Congress redefined
religion and installed the reasonable accommodation requirement in Title
VII.94 The Court has since read the reasonable accommodation requirement
narrowly, determining that a relatively minor justification—any
accommodation that requires more than de minimis cost is a qualifying
justification—may allow the employer to decline to provide the reasonable
accommodation.95 Of course, if the employer provides no reason at all for its

accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”).
89 See Henry Earle III & James R. McPherson, Religious Discrimination in Employment:
Employer’s Duty to Accommodate Employee’s Refusal to Work Scheduled Hours, 1987
DET. C.L. REV. 765, 765-66 (1987) [hereinafter Earle & McPherson, Religious
Discrimination] (“Congress attempted to provide employers with guidance by amending
Title 7 in 1972 by adding section 701(j), which provides that employers shall reasonably
accommodate an employee’s religious observance, practice, and belief, unless such
accommodation cannot be accomplished without undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer’s business.”).
90 Soon after Title VII’s passage, the EEOC issued guidelines that interpreted the
statute’s ban on religious discrimination as requiring that employers accommodate the
religious needs of its employees. See Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 72
(1977). In 1967, the EEOC restyled its guidelines to require that employers provide
reasonable accommodation for an employee’s religion unless such accommodation caused
an undue burden on the conduct of the employer’s business. See id. at 72-73 (describing the
1967 EEOC regulation).
91 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
92 See Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 328 (6th Cir. 1970). The employee
in the case joined the Faith Reformed Church years after beginning work with the employer.
See id. at 329. After the employee joined the church, he refused to work on Sundays. See id.
He also refused to find replacements to work for him on Sundays. See id. at 327-29.
93 See Dewey, 429 F.2d at 331.
94 See Earle & McPherson, Religious Discrimination, supra note 89, at 765-66.
95 See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84-85.
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refusal to reasonably accommodate, the refusal is an unlawful employment
practice.96
The Court interpreted the reasonable accommodation requirement in Trans
World Airlines v. Hardison.97 The facts in Hardison were similar to those in
Dewey. After plaintiff Hardison was hired, he began studying the Worldwide
Church of God faith and adopted its tenet that the faithful could not work on
the Sabbath, from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday.98 Trans World
Airlines (“TWA”) had a seniority system that determined shifts and work
hours.99 Hardison bid for and received a transfer to another department, where
his shift options were limited by his lack of seniority in his new department.100
In his new position, plaintiff was required to work Saturdays because of his
lack of seniority.101 TWA’s options to accommodate Hardison were to pay
premium (overtime) wages to another employee to cover Hardison’s shift from
Friday sundown to Saturday sundown, to leave another area undermanned on
days when plaintiff could not work, or to ignore the seniority system in the
collective bargaining agreement and let plaintiff bid for a job that would allow
him to not work on the Sabbath and other church holidays.102 None of the
options appear to have been seriously considered by TWA, and plaintiff was
fired when he refused to work Saturdays.103 Nonetheless, the Court ruled that
TWA’s refusal to accommodate was lawful under Title VII.104
The Court noted that Title VII requires that TWA reasonably accommodate
the employee, but focused on the supposed unfairness in the workplace that
would have been created had the reasonable accommodation provision
required that TWA adopt any of the available accommodations. The Court
deemed a requirement that the employer ignore the collective bargaining
agreement to provide the employee with his Sabbath day off unfair if it
required that a senior employee be disadvantaged.105 It noted that allocating
days off based on religious belief would be unfair106 and that requiring TWA to
spend money to provide the employee his Sabbath would also be unfair.107
96

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012).
See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 75.
98 Id. at 67-68.
99 Id. at 67.
100 Id. at 68.
101 Id.
102 See id. at 68-69.
103 See id. at 69.
104 See id. at 83.
105 See id. at 80.
106 See id. at 84-85. Indeed, the Court suggested that specially providing for an
employee’s Sabbath would discriminate against others who might be affected by such
accommodation. See id. at 85.
107 See id. at 84 (“To require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give
Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship.”).
97
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However, the Court did not consider other arguments that may have suggested
that providing the accommodation might be fair. It ignored that plaintiff may
not have been similarly situated with respect to some of his co-workers
regarding Sabbath. For example, the Court did not consider that some of
Hardison’s co-workers may not observe Sabbath and that forcing those
workers to work on a day off is quite different than requiring Hardison to work
on the Sabbath, particularly in a Title VII regime that is supposed to protect the
religious beliefs of employees. In addition, the Court did not seem concerned
that Hardison could not exercise his full seniority rights under TWA’s rules
because of TWA’s refusal to accommodate him more fully.108 Instead, the
Court ruled that an employer need not do much to discharge its duty to
accommodate and need not do much to demonstrate that the hardship
accompanying its reasonable accommodation would have been undue.
The narrowness of the Court’s interpretation of the reasonable
accommodation requirement is surprising. The requirement arguably focuses
on the employee’s religious rights.109 It requires that religious rights be
accommodated unless doing so would cause a significant problem for the
employer.110 Indeed, the reasonable accommodation requirement suggests that
the employer may be required to endure hardship to accommodate the
employee’s religion, so long as the hardship is not undue.111 However, the
Court has indicated that any required accommodation must be virtually
costless, even though costless accommodation is little more than what was
required in Dewey.112 Why any accommodation that yields more than de
minimis cost should qualify as an undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer’s business is not readily apparent. To be clear, it is not that requiring
a reasonable accommodation that comes with some cost necessarily butts up
against the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.113 The Court did not
108 Ironically, the Court has been very solicitous of the free exercise rights of employers,
even as the expansion of those rights affects statutory protections for employees. See, e.g.,
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987) (expanding Title VII’s religious employer exemption).
109 Of course, the reasonable accommodation process is not completely driven by the
employee. See Philbrook v. Ansonia, 479 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1986) (indicating that the
employer is under no obligation to accept employee’s proposed accommodation).
110 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012) (stating that employer must demonstrate “that he is
unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious
observance or practice without undue hardship”).
111 See id.
112 Even costless accommodation may not be sufficient, as plaintiff Hardison offered to
work to make up the cost of paying overtime for his Sabbath hours. See Hardison, 432 U.S.
at 95 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[O]ne accommodation Hardison suggested . . . requir[ed]
Hardison to work overtime when needed at regular pay.”).
113 Of course, at some point, government requirements may trigger Establishment Clause
concerns. See Estate of Thornton v. Calder, 472 U.S. 703, 708-09 (1985) (deeming state
statute that required that workers have right to not work on worker’s Sabbath to be violation

2015]

READING TITLE VII NARROWLY

797

indicate that providing a non-costless reasonable accommodation to employee
would be unconstitutional, only that such an accommodation would favor
religious employees.114
The Court’s approach to the reasonable accommodation requirement may
reflect its opinion regarding how a refusal to accommodate an employee relates
to an employer’s discriminatory motivation. Title VII bars discrimination
against an employee because of the employee’s religion.115 The reasonable
accommodation requirement provides an additional factor, but arguably does
not alter the requirement that religious discrimination occur. The Court may
assume that the refusal to grant a reasonable accommodation when the
employer has no reason to refuse the accommodation is proof of religious
discrimination. In addition, the Court may assume that an employer that
refuses to accommodate an employee because there is more than a de minimis
cost associated with an accommodation should not necessarily be deemed to be
motivated by religious discrimination because the cost of the accommodation
may explain the refusal to accommodate. Consequently, the refusal to grant a
reasonable accommodation that comes with more than de minimis cost could
be considered insufficient proof of an employer’s religious discrimination. Of
course, other proof of religious discrimination could be used to prove unlawful
discrimination. There may be some inherent logic in this position. However,
Title VII’s definition of religion incorporates a reasonable accommodation
requirement that appears to demand that an employer grant a reasonable
accommodation when that accommodation does not cause undue hardship to
the operation of the employer’s business.116 Consequently, a reading of the
requirement which allows for almost any burden to be considered undue is a
narrow one.
Some may argue that the narrowness of the Court’s interpretation of the
reasonable accommodation requirement stems from a lack of clarity regarding
the definition of undue hardship.117 A more robust or complete definition of
undue hardship, like the definition of undue burden in the ADA, may have led

of Establishment Clause, in part, because it had no reasonable accommodation provision
like Title VII). In other circumstances, they may trigger employer “free exercise” concerns.
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706
(2012) (“By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause,
which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its
appointments.”); Amos, 483 U.S. at 345 (“[T]his prospect of government intrusion raises
concern that a religious organization may be chilled in its free exercise activity.”).
114 See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84-85 (“[T]he privilege of having Saturdays off would be
allocated according to religious beliefs.”).
115 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
116 See id. § 2000e(j).
117 Indeed, the Court indicated such. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 75 (suggesting that
neither the EEOC nor Congress had indicated precisely what was required under the
reasonable accommodation provision).
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to a broader accommodation requirement.118 If so, the Court’s narrow reading
may be in response to Congress’s imperfect draftsmanship and would be
partially Congress’s fault. Nonetheless, Congress probably ought to assume
that the Court will narrowly interpret expansions of Title VII even when
Congress is clear. Consequently, definitions of key statutory terms should be
written as broadly as possible, so that if the Court narrows those definitions,
the ultimate coverage will not be too narrow.
Part IV considers how the Court has interpreted the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, another explicit expansion of Title VII coverage.
IV. PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION:
SEIZING THE LATITUDE TO INTERPRET SEX DISCRIMINATION NARROWLY
Sex discrimination has been prohibited by Title VII since the statute’s
inception.119 However, pregnancy discrimination has been explicitly prohibited
under Title VII only since Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
of 1978 (“PDA”), a statutory redefinition in Title VII that explicitly deems
pregnancy discrimination to be sex discrimination.120 The PDA was necessary
in the wake of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,121 where the Court ruled that
pregnancy discrimination was not necessarily sex discrimination under Title
VII.122 Though the Supreme Court had been willing to interpret sex
discrimination to include more than discrimination based solely on sex,123 the
118

However, there has been disagreement regarding how the Court should interpret the
reasonable accommodation requirement under the ADA. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,
535 U.S. 391 (2002) (discussing the content of the reasonable accommodation test and the
undue hardship test and how the tests interact). Of course, had Congress installed the ADA’s
undue burden test into the religious accommodation arena, the scope of Title VII’s religious
accommodation requirement would be much broader that it is currently, barring
constitutional problems. See Keith S. Blair, Better Disabled Than Devout? Why Title VII
Has Failed to Provide Adequate Accommodations Against Workplace Religious
Discrimination, 63 ARK. L. REV. 515, 537 (2010) (“Had the ADA standard been applied in
Hardison, the result would almost certainly have been different. Had TWA accommodated
Hardison in his preferred way, it would have incurred a cost of $150 per month for three
months.”).
119 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
120 As a result of the PDA, “because of sex” includes “because of pregnancy.” See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (“The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions
. . . .”).
121 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
122 See id. at 136 (“Since it is a finding of sex-based discrimination that must trigger, in a
case such as this, the finding of an unlawful employment practice under § 703(a)(1),
Geduldig is precisely in point in its holding that an exclusion of pregnancy from a disabilitybenefits plan providing general coverage is not a gender-based discrimination at all.”).
123 See Phillips v. Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (prohibiting rule that barred
mothers with preschool-aged children from being employed by employer, but allowing other
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Gilbert Court declined to treat pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination
when it approved the employer’s exclusion of pregnancy from the maladies
covered under its disability benefits plan.124 Congress replied with the PDA.125
The Court’s interpretation of the PDA has not been consistently narrow.
However, the Court’s decisions suggest a willingness to read the statute
narrowly when the Court desires.
Congress intended that the PDA help pregnant women in the workplace.126
However, how the PDA should do so is subject to debate. Whether the PDA
should protect pregnant women by treating them exactly the same as nonpregnant workers or by making sure that the conditions for pregnant women
are conducive for their work even if that allows for additional protection for
pregnant employees is a question.127 The PDA’s interpretive issues may stem
from the statute’s structure. One part of the PDA declares that pregnancy
discrimination is sex discrimination.128 The other part requires that pregnant
employees be treated the same as other employees whose work is similarly
affected by their physical condition.129 The statute may require that pregnancy,
like sex, be barred from consideration when employment policies or decisions
are made.130 Conversely, if the point of the statute is to eliminate and reverse
the headwinds that pregnant women have faced in the workplace, because
those headwinds amount to sex discrimination, the statute may require that

women to be employed). Since the passage of the PDA, the Court has expanded sex
discrimination to include sex stereotyping, see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
251-53 (1989), and sexual harassment, see, e.g., Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,
751-54 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-09 (1998); Meritor Sav.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
124 See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145-46.
125 See Calif. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 284 (1987) (asserting that
the PDA was passed in response to Gilbert).
126 See H.R. Rep. No. 95-948, at 3 (1978), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4751 (“As
testimony received by this committee demonstrates, the assumption that women will
become pregnant and leave the labor force leads to the view of women as marginal workers,
and is at the root of the discriminatory practices which keep women in low-paying and
dead-end jobs.”).
127 The issue is not new. For a brief discussion of the debate, see Shannon E. Liss, The
Constitutionality of Pregnancy Discrimination: The Lingering Effects of Geduldig and
Suggestions for Forcing Its Reversal, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 59, 67 n.35 (1997).
128 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
129 See id. § 2000e(k) (“[W]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt
of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in
their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this title [§ 703(h)]
shall be interpreted to permit otherwise . . . .”).
130 See, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197 (1991) (stating that
employer’s policy that allows fertile men but not fertile women to choose to work in highlead jobs is sex-based discrimination).
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latitude be given to make sure that pregnant workers can work whenever
possible. That could be thought to allow some latitude to give slightly better
working conditions to pregnant employees. The Court has taken both positions.
In Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,131 the Court
interpreted the PDA to limit how employers can provide differentiated
pregnancy benefits when such differentiation harms male employees.132 In
Newport News Shipbuilding, the employer’s health benefits plan provided
coverage for an employee’s pregnancy-related conditions on the same basis as
other health-related conditions.133 However, the plan provided less favorable
health benefits for the spouses of male employees than it provided for the male
spouses of female employees because the plan covered the pregnancies of the
female spouses of male employees less favorably than it covered the maladies
of male spouses of female employees.134 Given that, the Court deemed married
male employees to be treated differently and more poorly than married female
employees.135 Consequently, the Court determined that the employer had
violated Title VII.136
The Newport News Shipbuilding Court’s interpretation of the PDA reflects
the pure equality model; the decision was not particularly surprising. Indeed,
the EEOC’s interpretive guidelines—also focused on the pure equality
model—made clear that the employer’s approach to pregnancy benefits
qualified as treatment detrimental to male employees that should be considered
sex discrimination.137 Simply, pregnancy discrimination that harms only male
employees is sex discrimination. Ironically, had that thinking been recognized
in Gilbert, the PDA would not have been necessary because the pregnancy
discrimination at issue in Gilbert would have been considered sex
discrimination against women. Though the pure equality model tracks Title
VII’s ban on sex discrimination, the pure equality approach also has the
potential to limit an employer’s or a state’s ability to help pregnant women
thrive in the workplace.
The Court revisited the PDA in California Federal Savings and Loan
Association v. Guerra,138 concluding that the PDA allows states to mandate
benefits for pregnant employees that might lead employers to treat pregnant

131

462 U.S. 669 (1983).
See id. at 685.
133 See id. at 672.
134 See id.
135 The Court’s key language is: “[S]ince the sex of the spouse is always the opposite of
the sex of the employee, it follows inexorably that discrimination against female spouses in
the provision of fringe benefits is also discrimination against male employees.” Id. at 684.
Of course, in the era of same-sex marriage, this analysis becomes incomplete or inaccurate.
136 See id. at 685 (“The pregnancy limitation in this case violates Title VII by
discriminating against male employees.”).
137 Id. at 673-74.
138 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
132
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employees better than non-pregnant employees.139 At issue in Guerra was a
California statute that required that certain employers provide pregnant
workers a qualified right to reinstatement on return from pregnancy-related
leave.140 The statute did not require that all workers get similar benefits or bar
employers from providing such benefits to non-pregnant workers.141
Nonetheless, employers argued that the requirement violated or was preempted
by the PDA.142 The Court disagreed, ruling that the California law was not
inconsistent with the PDA or its purposes and did not require that employers
violate Title VII.143
Read together, Newport News Shipbuilding and Guerra appear to suggest
that the PDA may afford some amount of latitude to employers to provide
marginal extra benefits to pregnant employees when a statute so requires, but
appears to allow little latitude for private employers to give extra benefits to
pregnant workers voluntarily if such benefits effectively help or harm
employees of a single sex. Pregnancy discrimination could be likened to
affirmative action, with the bar on pregnancy discrimination and sex
discrimination existing to help pregnant women.144 A small lean in the
direction of helping pregnant women is not repugnant to the statute. However,
when the lean is not justified or is too strong, the overarching concern about
sex discrimination trumps the concern with helping pregnant women.145
Precisely where the line should be drawn is unclear.146 The Supreme Court

139 See id. at 292 (“The statute is not pre-empted by Title VII, as amended by the PDA,
because it is not inconsistent with the purposes of the federal statute, nor does it require the
doing of an act which is unlawful under Title VII.”).
140 See id. at 277.
141 See id. at 276.
142 See id. at 284.
143 See id. at 292.
144 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
145 See Guerra, 479 U.S. at 292-93 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“I believe that the PDA’s
posture as part of Title VII compels rejection of his argument that the PDA mandates
complete neutrality and forbids all beneficial treatment of pregnancy.”).
146 The Court has already suggested that the PDA’s effect may be narrow. In AT&T
Corp. v. Hulteen, the Court ruled that the employer’s use of old time-of-service (“TOS”)
rules that discriminated against pregnant persons as part of the employer’s determination of
time-of-service for current pension payments is lawful. See AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556
U.S. 701, 716 (2009) (finding that employer’s seniority system was bona fide and did not
improperly discriminate). The old TOS rules were made unlawful by the PDA. See id. at
705 (“On April 29, 1979, the effective date of the PDA, AT&T adopted its Anticipated
Disability Plan which replaced the MPP and provided service credit for pregnancy leave on
the same basis as leave taken for other temporary disabilities.”). However, the Court
concluded that because the discriminatory time-of-service rules were lawful at the time they
were used, continuing to use them to calculate current pension payments does not violate
Title VII. See id. at 707 (holding that “reliance on a pre-PDA differential accrual rule to
determine pension benefits does not constitute a current violation of Title VII”).
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declined to clarify the issue when it decided Young v. United Parcel Service,
Inc.,147 very recently.148
The Court’s treatment of pregnancy discrimination has not been consistently
narrow or broad. However, the Court has provided itself significant latitude to
define the scope of pregnancy discrimination. That allows the court to view
pregnancy discrimination as broadly or as narrowly as it wishes. The
implications for protections under ENDA are fairly clear. Expanding Title
VII’s coverage to sexual orientation and gender identity is somewhat similar to
expanding sex discrimination to cover pregnancy discrimination. Title VII’s
ban on sex discrimination could have been interpreted to cover sexual
orientation and gender identity discrimination in the first instance, but as with
pregnancy discrimination, it was not.149 Similarly, as with pregnancy
discrimination, the addition of sexual orientation and gender identity to Title
VII would protect groups that have been treated poorly in the workplace.
Without clear statutory guidance, how to protect those groups would be a
question with the pure equality versus additional benefits issue arising in the
sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination areas. Congress ought to
draft ENDA to guarantee that the issue is resolved on the face of the statute
and is not left to interpretation.
CONCLUSION
When given the choice of a broad reading or a narrow reading of explicit
expansions of Title VII, the Court has often chosen the narrow reading.
Whether the Court’s choice is based on hostility to the expansion or
interpretive license or inelegant drafting by Congress, the Court appears poised
147

2015 WL 1310745 (U.S. Sup. Ct. March 25, 2015).
In Young, the plaintiff, a delivery driver for UPS, sued after UPS declined to provide
her an accommodation after her doctor advised her that she should not lift packages over a
certain weight during the remainder of her pregnancy. See id. at *4. UPS argued that it only
accommodated three types of workers: those injured on the job, those who had a disability
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and those who had lost their Department of
Transportation certification. See id. at *5 (specifying workers who had been
accommodated). The employer argued that it treated pregnant employees like employees
who had been injured while off the job and therefore did not violate the PDA because it
provided equal treatment to pregnant workers. See id. at *10. The plaintiff argued that UPS
accommodated some employees who were similarly situated to her regarding their inability
to work and that therefore the employer had violated the PDA. See id. Rather than clarifying
how broadly or narrowly the PDA ought to be interpreted by directly evaluating UPS’
policy, the Court decided that the case would be resolved as any other disparate treatment
case would be resolved, with the plaintiff required to prove that the employer’s refusal to
accommodate plaintiff was intentionally discriminatory. See id. at *15-16.
149 For a brief discussion of the intersection of sex discrimination and sexual orientation
discrimination, see Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Discrimination, Plain and Simple, 36 TULSA L.
J. 557, 575-77 (2001) (“While sex discrimination is actionable, sexual orientation
discrimination has not been.”).
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to narrow any statutory language it wishes to narrow by any means necessary.
The Supreme Court’s approach makes an attempt to graft a mere expansion of
the bases on which employers are prohibited from discriminating possibly
insufficient. If Congress wants its intentions honored, it may need to be
explicit about precisely how the expansion of Title VII is to be interpreted. In
the alternative, Congress may need to draft language that is broader than
necessary in order to guarantee that the core of the discrimination it wishes to
ban will actually be banned if the Court narrowly interprets the expansion.
There are lessons for ENDA. The current version of ENDA is fairly robust
and relatively detailed. It should stay that way. If ENDA is eventually whittled
to a simple expansion of the definition of sex discrimination to include sexual
orientation and gender identity or to a simple new section of Title VII that adds
coverage for sexual orientation and gender identity, the supporters of ENDA
may have to fight a losing battle against a Court that has shown that it is
willing to read explicit expansions of Title VII as narrowly as possible. If that
occurs, the fault will arguably be with ENDA’s drafters. The Court has made
its proclivities clear. ENDA’s drafters need to take the interpretive power out
of the Court’s hands by making as clear as possible precisely how and how
broadly ENDA is supposed to protect sexual orientation and gender identity.

